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Abstract
There is substantial interest in targeted cancer therapies, spurred by recent biomedical research in genomics
and oncology. Targeted cancer therapies, in which prevention and treatment of cancer are based on genomic
and biologic analyses, hold promise for cancer care. However, the rising costs of such therapies may threaten
that promise. In an effort to meet the future challenges of targeted cancer medicine head-on, the University of
Pennsylvania convened the Gant Family Precision Cancer Medicine Consortium, a multidisciplinary work
group of experts from health care economics, policy, law, regulation, cancer research and medicine, patient
advocacy, and the pharmaceutical and insurance industry. The Gant Consortium sought answers to a central
question: what approaches should stakeholders take to foster the economic viability and sustainability of
targeted cancer drugs? The Consortium literature review was conducted from August through November
2016. The expert committee met regularly from October 2016 to May 2017 to identify points of contention
and consensus, outline the issues at the core of sustainable targeted cancer medicine, and inform potential
policy recommendations. The literature presented in this report does not include therapies developed
afterwards, such as CAR-T. The views expressed in this White Paper reflect the discussions of the Gant
Consortium but do not necessarily represent the views of either any individual member or of the Consortium
as a whole.
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Introduction:  
It Takes a Consortium 
There is substantial interest in targeted cancer therapies, 
spurred by recent biomedical research in genomics and 
oncology. Targeted cancer therapies, in which prevention 
and treatment of cancer are based on genomic and biologic 
analyses, hold promise for cancer care. However, the rising 
costs of such therapies may threaten that promise.
In an effort to meet the future challenges of targeted cancer 
medicine head-on, the University of Pennsylvania convened 
the Gant Family Precision Cancer Medicine Consortium, 
a multidisciplinary work group of experts from health care 
economics, policy, law, regulation, cancer research and 
medicine, patient advocacy, and the pharmaceutical and 
insurance industry. The Gant Consortium sought answers to 
a central question: what approaches should stakeholders take 
to foster the economic viability and sustainability of targeted 
cancer drugs? 
The Consortium literature review was conducted from 
August through November 2016. The expert committee met 
regularly from October 2016 to May 2017 to identify points 
of contention and consensus, outline the issues at the core of 
sustainable targeted cancer medicine, and inform potential 
policy recommendations. The literature presented in this 
report does not include therapies developed afterwards, such 
as CAR-T. 
The views expressed in this White Paper reflect the 
discussions of the Gant Consortium but do not necessarily 
represent the views of either any individual member or of the 
Consortium as a whole.
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What is Targeted Oncology?  
PERSONALIZED MEDICINE, PRECISION 
MEDICINE, AND TRENDS IN ONCOLOGY  
Understanding and applying genomic and biologic analyses 
holds promise for cancer, a disease defined by abnormal cell 
growth brought on by genetic mutation. As genetic testing 
and genomic data have informed cancer care, the perception 
of cancer as a limited number of tissue– and organ–specific 
diseases has given way to a paradigm of hundreds of different 
diseases, defined, in part, by their underlying genomic 
alterations. Different diseases require novel treatments, and 
some observers view targeted therapy as the future of cancer 
care. A 2015 study found that the percentage of patients who 
received targeted cancer therapies increased from 11% in 2001 
to 42% in 2011.1 
Targeted cancer therapies rely on the diagnostic identification 
of biologic (including but not limited to genomic) targets 
within cancer cells. Targeted therapies can include inhibitors 
that block the growth of tumor cells, immunotherapies that 
stimulate the body’s immune system to destroy cancer cells, 
therapies that block the production or action of hormones 
that stimulate tumor growth, and antibodies that bind to and 
attack cancer cells.2 
TARGETED CANCER THERAPY: 
A DEFINITION 
References to targeted cancer therapies often label them 
“precision medicine,” but the definition of precision medicine 
is often imprecise. Personalized medicine may be a useful 
umbrella term for tailoring health care to the needs of 
individual patients, but the relevant factors for customization—
genetics and biomarkers, socioeconomic, lifestyle, the focus 
on prevention versus treatment—are infrequently aligned 
across definitions.  As part of the national Precision Medicine 
Initiative (PMI), now called “All of Us,” the National Institutes 
of Health (NIH) define precision medicine broadly as “an 
emerging approach for disease treatment and prevention that 
takes into account individual variability in genes, environment, 
and lifestyle for each person.”3
A more narrow definition of precision cancer therapies, 
from Doug Lowy of the National Cancer Institute, is: 
“Interventions to prevent, diagnose, or treat cancer, based 
on a molecular and/or mechanistic understanding of the 
causes, pathogenesis, and/or pathology of the disease. Where 
the individual characteristics of the patient are sufficiently 
distinct, interventions can be concentrated on those who 
will benefit, sparing expense and side effects for those 
who will not.” In contrast to “All of Us,” this view focuses on 
leveraging genomic information to treat and prevent cancer. 
The Gant Consortium used a more direct term, “targeted 
cancer therapies,” defined as cancer treatments that rely on 
diagnostic identification of targets within cancer cells—such as 
small molecules, monoclonal antibodies, and other therapies—
and require genomic and related analyses.
The Gant Consortium used a 
more direct term, “targeted cancer 
therapies,” defined as cancer 
treatments that rely on diagnostic 
identification of targets within 
cancer cells—such as small 
molecules, monoclonal antibodies, 
and other therapies—and require 
genomic and related analyses.
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THE PROMISE OF TARGETED  
CANCER MEDICINE  
Visions of curing cancer are an American mainstay. Cancer 
treatment is expensive, has substantial side effects, and is 
emotionally and physically taxing. Thus, targeting treatments 
to individuals who are most likely to benefit has become a 
commonly held goal. A recent article from the American 
Society of Clinical Oncology presents this vision: “As our 
deepening understanding of tumor biology converges with 
rapid advances in measurement science and technology and 
computational analysis, we have an enormous opportunity 
to create a future for precision medicine in oncology that 
provides for highly specific, minimally toxic, and dramatically 
effective treatment for each patient.”4 
National programs, such as the Cancer Moonshot, All of 
Us, and the Biden Cancer Initiative demonstrate renewed 
interest in cancer research and treatment. Targeted oncology 
is the focus of much of this research: The 21st Century Cures 
Act of 2016 authorized $1.8 billion in funding for the Cancer 
Moonshot over seven years. Recent cancer drug approvals 
reflect this focus: The average number of approved new 
cancer therapies rose from 4.9 from 2001-2010 to 10.3 from 
2011-2013, largely driven by approvals of targeted therapies.5
Targeted approaches have led to a number of breakthroughs 
in oncology. Imatinib (Gleevec) has dramatically improved 
care for chronic myelogenous leukemia (CML), turning a 
deadly disease into a managed condition for many patients.6 
For patients with HER2 positive breast cancer (approximately 
30% of patients), Trastuzumab (Herceptin) significantly cuts 
the risk of recurrence and death.7 In 2017, the FDA approved 
Keytruda (pembrolizumab), which was already approved for 
melanoma, non-small-cell lung cancer, and head and neck 
cancer, for tumors with certain biomarkers—the first time the 
FDA approved a cancer drug based on its molecular target, 
regardless of where the tumor originated. 
THE SKEPTIC’S TAKE: INSUFFICIENT 
EVIDENCE, LIMITED RELEVANCE, AND 
SKYROCKETING PRICES  
Some stakeholders are skeptical that targeted cancer 
medicine will ever fulfill its promise.  At least three factors 
contribute to pushback: the relative infrequency of 
identifiable, actionable genetic mutations in tumors, the lack 
of evidence for increased long-term efficacy of targeted 
drugs as compared to non-targeted treatments, and the cost 
of targeted cancer medications. 
Targeted therapy may help only a small subset of cancer 
patients. A sequencing program at the MD Anderson 
Cancer Center in Houston found that only 6.4% of cancer 
patients had tumor mutations that could pair with a targeted 
drug. Complicated cancers may have several mutations, and 
increased response rates do not guarantee improved overall 
survival. A recent meta-analysis found that while the use of 
biomarkers to select patients for phase 1 trials was associated 
with improved treatment response rates (30.6% vs. 4.9%), 
progression-free survival increased only from 2.95 to 5.7 
months.8 For many therapies, there is insufficient evidence 
from randomized control trials to claim that a targeted 
approach can dramatically improve survival above benefits 
from non-targeted therapies.9 Targeted therapies to inhibit 
tumor growth may extend median survival in the short term, 
but further mutations within the tumor may result in cancers 
that are resistant to those treatments in the long term. 
Mixed evidence has not slowed down the rate of research 
and drug development. Targeted therapies have become 
the norm in much of cancer care,1 and a recent study found 
that the number of new targeted drugs approved for cancer 
doubled in the 1990s, and increased again more than two-
fold in the 2000s.5 In 2016, the FDA approved six new cancer 
drugs out of 22 total new drugs, four of which were targeted 
therapies.10
For many, the growth of research interest and shifts in 
approaches to chemotherapy represent a paradigm shift 
in cancer care. To others, the velocity of research and 
development of targeted cancer drugs, along with their prices, 
appears to be out of step with the available evidence. What 
all sides may agree on, however, is that cancer as a disease 
appears to occupy a unique position in society. 
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Is Cancer Special? 
The Emperor of All Maladies: A Biography of Cancer won the 
2011 Pulitzer Prize for Non-Fiction and became a New York 
Times best seller. The runaway success of a nearly 600-page 
medical history raises a question: is cancer special?  From a 
policy perspective, diseases are exceptional if they are treated 
differently than other comparable conditions. Exceptional 
treatment includes a willingness to commit more financial and 
social resources, per unit of burden, than other diseases. The 
Gant Consortium considered two interlocking claims: first, 
is cancer treated differently than other, similar diseases, and 
second, should it be? 
CANCER IN THE PUBLIC EYE 
Cancer evokes great concern in public opinion and mass 
media. Public opinion surveys suggest that cancer is a widely 
feared disease. A Mayo Clinic survey found that most 
Americans believe that the country’s most significant health 
care challenge is cancer.11 Media coverage of cancer features 
headlines such as: “Report: Cancer will be No. 1 killer in U.S.”12 
The language around cancer often includes metaphors of 
“battle,” “war,” and “struggle.” Unlike most conditions, the first 
question doctors hear after giving a cancer diagnosis is, “how 
long do I have?” 
Much of this anxiety is justified. Cancer is the second leading 
cause of death in the United States, causing approximately 
590,000 deaths in 2017.13 As Americans live longer, cancer 
incidence rates continue to rise, and nearly 40% of Americans 
will be diagnosed with cancer at some point.14 Almost every 
American has been personally touched by cancer through 
either a friend or family member. However, the diversity of 
cancer complicates the narrative of cancer as a widespread, 
debilitating cause of mortality. Some cancers are very early 
stage and grow too slowly to warrant treatment. For example, 
NIH guidelines suggest that many men with Grade I localized 
low-risk prostate cancer may forgo or delay treatment in favor 
of surveillance.15   
CANCER FUNDING FOR RESEARCH AND 
DRUG DEVELOPMENT
Public attention to cancer is matched by considerable 
research attention. The Cancer Moonshot and 21st Century 
Cures Act, which appropriated billions of dollars of federal 
funding for cancer research, are only the most recent 
examples of a high-profile focus on cancer. Sustained 
attention to cancer dates back to Nixon’s 1971 “War on 
Cancer.” The research interest stretches across the public 
and private sectors: A 2015 JAMA study found that cancer 
accounted for 16% of all NIH funding ($5.6 billion) in 2013, 
and 25% of all drugs in clinical trials.16 In addition to funding 
across the spectrum of biomedical research, cancer accounts 
for a substantial share of drug development; in one review 
of trends, 32.6% of all drugs in development in 2017 had an 
oncologic target.17
Some experts argue that the allocation of research resources 
should be matched to the societal burden of each disease. 
The quantitative tools used to measure population-level 
disease burden include aggregate Quality Adjusted Life 
Years (QALYs), Disability Adjusted Life Years (DALYs), Years 
of Life Lost (YLLs), and number of deaths. In theory, the 
allocation of scarce resources, they argue, ought to track with 
the societal disease burden. However, it seldom does.
Public and private funding for cancer research is higher than 
most measures of disease burden would predict. A recent 
study of funding trends modeled expected public funding for 
research based on disease burden, measured in lost disability 
adjusted life years (DALYs). Among a set of 27 diseases, 
public funding was only marginally associated with US disease 
burden, and cancer was overfunded—only HIV/AIDS had a 
larger deviation.16 
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Funding variations also exist across different types of cancer. 
A study evaluated the National Cancer Institute’s distribution 
of funding and revealed a mismatch within cancer between 
funding levels and disease burden. Leukemia, breast cancer, 
and prostate cancer were overfunded, while liver cancer, 
pancreatic cancer, and esophageal cancer were underfunded. 
Lung cancer receives only 10% of cancer research funding, 
despite accounting for 32% of all cancer deaths.18 
Many researchers question whether the disease burden 
approach can capture the full value of cancer research, 
including its external social and scientific benefits. Cancer 
research often lies at the leading edge of biomedical 
research—including hematology, immunology, and 
genomics—and potential for breakthrough treatments for 
cancer may have downstream effects for other diseases. 
Just as NASA-led research in the 1960s yielded scientific 
breakthroughs beyond space travel, funding for biomedical 
research, and especially cancer research, may not fit into 
neatly defined buckets. Furthermore, some argue that 
resource allocation should reflect patient and public values. 
If, for example, Americans value avoiding a year of life lost to 
cancer more than a year of life lost to other diseases because 
of fears specific to cancer, those preferences ought to be 
reflected in resource allocation. Such a holistic framework 
towards value of research is attractive, but it is difficult to 
define. 
SPENDING ON CANCER TREATMENT 
Disproportionate spending on cancer continues once 
treatments come to market. A recent review of 54 studies 
compared incremental cost-effectiveness ratios (ICERs) of 
cancer drugs and non-cancer drugs. Cancer drugs had mean 
and median ICERs of $138,582/QALY and $55,000/QALY, 
respectively, while non-cancer drugs had mean and median 
ICERs of $49,913/QALY and $31,000/QALY, respectively. 
Among cancer drugs, 30% of treatments had ICERs above 
$100,000/QALY, compared to 10% of non-cancer drugs.19 
This suggests that when cancer is the diagnosis, consumers 
and third-party payers will pay twice as much for the identical 
therapeutic benefit.   
Source: The anatomy of medical research: US and international comparisons. JAMA. 2015;313(2):174-189. doi:10.1001/jama.2014.15939. (Online Appendix)
Figure 1.  Relationship Between NIH Disease-Specific Research Funding and Burden of Disease for Selected Conditions
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These value thresholds for cancer drugs have increased 
over time. A study in the Journal of Economic Perspectives 
evaluated pricing trends for 58 cancer drugs from 1995 to 
2013 and found that approval prices per life-year gained had 
nearly quadrupled, after adjusting for inflation.20 A more 
detailed discussion of costs and spending on targeted cancer 
drugs is found in the next chapter.
SPECIAL FUNDING CARVE-OUTS 
INTERNATIONALLY
The exceptional nature of cancer is reflected in the 
proliferation of “ring fencing” in some countries, in which 
assessment, approval, and payment for cancer drugs lie 
outside the normal cost-efficacy and drug approval processes. 
Proponents of ring fencing argue that the practice is 
protective. The argument assumes that cancer is a unique 
disease, and the typical measures of value and cost-efficacy 
do not apply. Patients are not seeking a median overall 
survival benefit; rather, they are seeking a chance to do better 
than average given their diagnosis. Because cancer drugs 
are unusually expensive, and the way society values them 
is qualitatively different, ring fencing protects budgets for 
cancer from being whittled away by other diseases, and vice 
versa. Skeptics claim that, from an economic perspective, 
there is no rationale for separating out cancer drugs for 
resource allocation purposes. Any ring fencing will impede a 
payer’s ability to maximize aggregate health benefits. 
RING FENCING: THE UK CANCER  
DRUGS FUND (CDF)   
Cancer’s status is controversial in the United Kingdom, where 
the socialized National Health Service (NHS) has struggled 
to balance cost-effectiveness, equity, and the unique demands 
of cancer. NHS relies on the National Institute for Health 
and Care Excellence (NICE) to conduct cost-effectiveness 
analyses for approval of new drugs and technologies. 
Generally, NHS will only cover pharmaceuticals with a 
recommendation from NICE, which has a maximum threshold 
of £100,000 per QALY. In 2010, widespread concern that 
cancer patients were not given access to potentially life-
saving drugs—because NICE had either not approved, 
not appraised, or too slowly studied the drugs—led to the 
establishment of the Cancer Drug Fund (CDF) in England. 
The CDF had a ring fenced budget and a distinct approval 
process for drugs. In short, the CDF allowed patients to 
access drugs before receiving NICE approval. 
A 2014 study in the British Journal of Cancer found that 
the CDF had a substantial impact on prescribing patterns 
for cancer drugs in England. The CDF was associated 
with increased prescribing for drugs that NICE had either 
rejected or given a mixed recommendation, but not for drugs 
that NICE had deemed cost-effective. The early evidence 
suggested that the CDF was primarily used to access drugs 
that were eventually not deemed cost-effective by NICE, 
rather than expedite access to new, cost-effective cancer 
treatments that were stalled in the NICE/NHS approval 
process.21  
Despite a strategic vision of moving towards value-based 
pricing schemes, the CDF could not keep up with the cost 
of drug approvals: Its original budget of £50 million per 
year grew to £340 million within 5 years. By the time it was 
folded back in to NICE, the CDF had overspent its budget 
by an order of magnitude, paying out £1.27 billion on cancer 
drugs. The CDF remains controversial, and recent literature 
suggests that it may have been counterproductive for cancer 
patients and English society at large.22 
SHOULD CANCER BE SPECIAL? 
The argument over whether cancer ought to be treated as 
special remains far from settled. On the one hand, some 
claim that resources should be directed to diseases and 
treatments in proportion to their empirically demonstrated 
impact on individual patients and population health. Using 
this framework, the fact that some diseases carry the name 
“cancer” should not be a consideration. On the other hand, 
many stakeholders contend that cancer is a unique disease 
in clinically salient ways. It demands coordination among 
surgeons, pathologists, geneticists, and oncologists. From 
a research perspective, the complexity of cancer treatment 
reflects an interconnected research agenda. Cancer research 
is not a tidy work plan with clearly delineated objectives; it 
is a multidisciplinary biomedical endeavor under study on 
multiple fronts. According to this line of thinking, cancer is the 
“emperor of all maladies,” and it requires a different paradigm 
for resource allocation. 
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Recent Spending Trends for 
Targeted Cancer Drugs 
PRESCRIPTION DRUG SPENDING IN THE 
UNITED STATES 
In 2013, Americans spent an average of $858 per capita 
on prescription drugs—more than double the average of 
similar industrialized countries.23 The $450 billion spent on 
drugs account for approximately 17% of overall health care 
spending,24 and $37 billion of drug spending was devoted to 
cancer.20 High costs for prescription drugs can have important 
clinical and economic effects. A quarter of Americans have 
failed to fill or take medications due to cost,25 and a diverse 
literature links high drug costs and cost sharing with poor 
medication adherence and worse health outcomes.26  
THE FOCUS ON CANCER DRUG PRICES 
Average prices for new cancer drugs routinely exceed 
$100,000 per year.27  Studies confirm an upward trend in 
prices and spending on cancer drugs: A review of commercial 
claims found that monthly spending on new cancer drugs 
during the year of product launch increased from $1,869 in 
2000 to $11,325 in 2014.28 Monthly out-of-pocket expenses 
can reach nearly $1,000 per month. For many families, 
the financial burden that accompanies health care can be 
substantial. A Commonwealth Fund study found that over 
25% of Medicare beneficiaries spent at least 20% of their 
income on health care in 2016.29 
High costs for patients may reduce medication adherence 
as well. A recent study in the Journal of Clinical Oncology 
found that cancer patients with greater than $500 in cost-
sharing expenses were four times more likely to abandon 
their prescriptions as patients with less than $100 in out-
of-pocket costs, and over half of patients with more than 
$500 in cost-sharing failed to fill prescriptions for cancer 
medications.26 Thus, physicians, patients, and policymakers all 
have an interest in understanding what is driving the growth in 
spending on cancer drugs. The Gant Consortium examined 
two sustained trends driving spending growth in targeted 
cancer drugs: higher launch prices and compounding annual 
price hikes.  
LAUNCH PRICES AND YEARLY PRICE HIKES  
Prices for new cancer drugs have reliably risen on a yearly 
basis. A recent economic analysis of cancer drugs found that 
launch prices for cancer drugs increased by 10% annually—an 
average of $8,500 per year—from 1995 to 2013.20  While some 
cancer drugs may be steadily delivering improved survival, 
some researchers argue that price inflation has outstripped 
health benefits. As an economic study from Howard et al. 
notes, “in 1995 patients and their insurers paid $54,100 for a 
year of life. A decade later, 2005, they paid $139,000 for the 
same benefit. By 2013, they were paying $207,000.”20 
After cancer drugs hit the market, prices tend to continue to 
increase. These yearly price hikes of FDA-approved drugs 
significantly outpace inflation, suggesting an absence of 
competition. A recent analysis found that inflation-adjusted 
per-person monthly prices increased an average of 5% per 
year from 2007 through 2013.30 The prices of Imatinib and 
Erlotinib have risen an average of 7.5% per year since 2001, 
though the drugs’ efficacy and use have not changed.28 
Critics of high prices frequently cite small average survival 
benefits, but this claim may fail to account for important 
context. Because targeted therapies focus on subsets of 
patients, looking at average survival across an unselected 
population may be misleading. For the responding patient 
subset, targeted drugs may be far more effective. As 
responding groups provide data, more effective targeting can 
take place—an iterative process not reflected in aggregated 
survival data. On the other hand, as the relevant subset of 
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patients that will most respond to a given treatment shrinks, 
prices are likely to continue to spike as pharmaceutical 
companies seek to meet revenue benchmarks in rarified 
markets. 
MARKET DRIVERS OF PRESCRIPTION  
DRUG PRICES: MONOPOLISTIC 
REFERENCE PRICING 
It is difficult to disaggregate drivers of targeted cancer drug 
prices from trends in the larger pharmaceutical market. 
Federal regulation grants patents and market exclusivity 
to drug companies for new and reformulated drugs, and 
prices appear to be whatever the market will bear. Drug 
makers have monopolistic pricing power during periods of 
exclusivity, private payers are fragmented, and Medicare is 
barred from directly negotiating drug prices. In such a market, 
prices can appear disconnected from value. Rather, prices 
reflect a calculation based on price elasticity and market size: 
Manufacturers set the highest price that consumers, including 
third-party payers, are willing to pay in order to generate 
the most revenue. In the United States, some argue that 
pharmaceutical companies set launch prices for new cancer 
drugs within 10% of previous drugs, regardless of comparative 
effectiveness or competition. 
MARKET DRIVERS OF PRESCRIPTION DRUG 
PRICES: DISCOUNT OFFSETTING  
List prices for prescription drugs rarely reflect the price 
paid by patients and payers. Many observers contend 
that discounts and rebates in the private and public sector 
incentivize higher launch prices to offset future write-offs. 
At the federal level, the government mandates discounts for 
certain classes of buyers—such as federally qualified health 
centers and hospitals with a high proportion of low income 
patients—through the 340B program. The 340B discount is 
based on the drug’s average price, which incentivizes setting 
higher launch prices to offset those discounts. Medicaid has 
its own idiosyncratic pricing rules. Manufacturers must give 
rebates to the federal government on sales to Medicaid 
patients, which may provide an additional incentive for 
Source: Drug Pricing Trends for Orally Administered Anticancer Medications Reimbursed by Commercial Health Plans, 2000-2014, JAMA Oncology, 
2016;2(7):960-961.
Figure 2.  Mean Monthly Spending for Orally Administered Anticancer Medications During the Year of Product Launch, 2000-2014
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high prices. Insurers and employers hire pharmacy benefit 
managers (PBMs) to create drug formularies, negotiate 
discounts, and set up rebates with drug manufacturers. Given 
the complicated and non-transparent discount and rebate 
structure, launch prices may simply represent a high opening 
bid for a protracted negotiation. 
MARKET DRIVERS OF PRESCRIPTION DRUG 
PRICES: PRICE INELASTICITY, PHYSICIAN 
INCENTIVES, AND DRUG DEVELOPMENT    
There may be demand-induced causes of regular drug price 
increases as well. As families hit their deductibles and out-
of-pocket maximums, they tend to become indifferent to 
the cost of a drug. High deductible health plans may have 
an impact, but patients in general and those with cancer in 
particular tend to be inelastic purchasers.  
Supply-induced drivers, such as physician incentives, may 
also play a role. In Medicare Part B’s “buy and bill” payment 
structure, physicians are paid based on a percentage of 
the drug sales prices, which incentivizes physicians to use 
expensive drugs. Thus, many physicians have little to no 
financial incentive to seek out lower cost, clinically equivalent 
treatment options. 
Finally, pharmaceutical companies argue that barriers 
to market entry, production costs, and research and 
development investment require high prices to recoup 
outlays. Drug manufacturers argue that they must recoup all 
of their costs during the marketing exclusivity period, which 
requires hitting the market with high launch prices. Critics 
of these explanations suggest that the widely publicized 
figure of $2.7 billion per drug from the Tufts Center for the 
Study of Drug Development remains unverified. Public 
Citizen estimates the cost of developing a single drug to be 
$320 million, and a recent study in JAMA Internal Medicine 
estimates the cost of developing a single cancer drug to 
be $648 million on average, while median revenue since 
approval is $1.65 billion.31 Whatever the actual average cost of 
drug development is, new drug development is a multi-year 
process with high rates of failure that carry financial downside 
risk, and once an effective drug hits the market manufacturers 
must derive enough revenue to pay for ongoing research and 
development. 
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Value Frameworks 
Paying for value, instead of volume, has become the focus of 
health reform efforts. Value is more than a political buzzword. 
In response to rising costs, payers, physicians, and patients 
have considered value assessment frameworks to inform 
treatment plans and design sustainable budgets. Due to the 
relatively high number of new drugs reaching the market 
each year, cancer drugs have become a focus of many new 
frameworks aimed at capturing the value of therapies.   
Early movers include the American Society of Clinical 
Oncology (ASCO) Value Framework,32 National 
Comprehensive Cancer Network (NCCN) Evidence 
Blocks,33 and the Institute for Clinical and Economic Review 
(ICER) Value Assessment Framework.34 While these tools 
share a goal of creating a rigorous framework for thinking 
about the value of drugs, they differ in mission, methodology, 
and scope. ASCO and NCCN’s tools are designed for shared 
medical decision making, while ICER helps insurers negotiate 
drug prices and develop sustainable drug formularies. 
THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF CLINICAL 
ONCOLOGY (ASCO) VALUE FRAMEWORK 
ASCO developed a framework for shared decision 
making between physicians and patients. The ASCO 
value framework generates a Net Health Benefit (NHB) 
score based on clinical benefit, toxicity, symptom palliation, 
and quality of life measures. The NHB synthesizes useful 
assessments of relevant data, which can be weighted 
according to patient preferences. 
The first component of NHB is the clinical benefit score, 
which is calculated with overall survival (OS), progression-
free survival (PFS), or response rate (RR). OS is the 
preferred outcome measure, followed by PFS and RR if OS 
is unavailable. The ASCO framework then assigns a toxicity 
score based on the severity and likelihood of side effects. If 
the new treatment regime is more toxic than the comparator 
treatment, the toxicity score is subtracted from the clinical 
benefit score. For new treatments with a lower toxicity than 
the comparator, the toxicity score is added to the clinical 
benefit score. 
Finally, the ASCO framework adds several sets of bonus 
points: “tail of the curve” survival, patient-reported quality of 
life, palliation of symptoms, and treatment-free intervals. The 
weight of these metrics can be increased based on patient 
values, in an acknowledgement that improved survival or 
disease control are not the only important measures of a 
cancer drug’s value.  Bonus points for the tail of the curve 
address a particular concern for cancer: how to account for 
a novel treatment that leads to a survival benefit in a sizable 
minority of patients, even though most patients will not see 
much benefit.  
ASCO’s value framework does not consider the cost of a drug 
to the health system. Rather, it lists a drug acquisition cost 
(DAC) for the patient as the relevant measure, a cost that 
each patient and family must define themselves. Presenting 
net health benefit scores alongside the DAC allows physicians 
and patients to determine the relative value of different 
courses of treatment. Some researchers have taken up the 
task pre-emptively: A recent study in the Journal of Oncology 
Practice used ASCO’s value framework to construct a value-
based ranking of frontline treatments for ovarian cancer.35
NATIONAL COMPREHENSIVE CANCER 
NETWORK (NCCN) EVIDENCE BLOCKS 
NCCN’s Evidence Blocks are also designed as shared 
decision making tools. NCCN measures five aspects of a 
treatment: efficacy, safety, quality of evidence, consistency 
of evidence, and affordability. Unlike ASCO, each aspect of 
a treatment is assessed by a panel of NCCN members, not 
physicians at the bedside. 
NCCN Evidence Blocks provide visual snapshots of 
treatment options for different types of cancer. Each measure 
is rated from 1 to 5, with 1 being the lowest score. For 
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efficacy, a score of 1 indicates only palliative, while a score of 
5 indicates a drug that often provides long-term survival or 
curative advantage. Similarly, toxicity scores range from highly 
toxic to no meaningful toxicity, quality of evidence scores 
range from little to no evidence to multiple well-designed 
randomized trials and/or meta-analyses, and consistency of 
evidence ranges from anecdotal to highly consistent across 
trials. 
While NCCN evidence blocks produce a simple output, 
the methodology is relatively opaque. NCCN panel 
members make their own assessment for each drug, and 
the methodology is not open to other stakeholders or open 
comment. Notably, affordability does not speak to individual 
patient situations. Ultimately, it is up to the physician and 
patient to make sense of the evidence blocks as they relate to 
their own treatment preferences. 
INSTITUTE FOR CLINICAL AND ECONOMIC 
REVIEW (ICER) 
The ICER value framework can inform population-level 
perspectives and support evidence-based guidelines 
for appropriate care, drug pricing, insurance coverage 
determinations, and payment methods. For new drugs, ICER 
delivers reports on value and affordability, with the stated 
end goal of providing sustainable access to quality drugs for 
patients. 
ICER uses four frames to assess the long-term population-
level value for money of a new drug: comparative clinical 
effectiveness, estimated incremental cost-effectiveness, other 
benefits or disadvantages, and contextual considerations. The 
long-term value for money judgement is paired with a short-
term potential budget impact assessment in ICER’s reports. 
These measures translate into a care value designation, which 
informs the assessment of potential short-term budget impact 
and long-term value for money.34
When judging comparative clinical effectiveness, ICER 
evaluates evidence of clinical benefit from multiple sources—
although randomized control trials are preferred—and assigns 
a grade for new drug benefit over comparator, ranging from 
negative net benefit to substantial net benefit. ICER lists 
seven potential benefits or disadvantages and five contextual 
considerations to include, such as bonuses for drugs that 
reduce health disparities, lessen caregiver burden, or provide 
novel mechanisms of action that may treat patients who were 
previously unable to be successfully treated.34 With a clinical 
benefit assessment in hand, ICER drafts incremental cost-
effectiveness analyses. These reports primarily use cost per 
additional quality adjusted life year, with a benchmark with a 
willingness to pay of $50,000 to $150,000 per QALY. Drugs 
coming in above the threshold are listed as “low value,” and 
drugs below the threshold are listed as “high value.”34
ICER’s potential budget impact is treated separately from 
questions of value to a health system. Rather, the budget 
impact models estimate impacts of a drug at different prices 
and uptake rates. Thus, ICER assumes that health systems 
and payers will use the impact analysis and local knowledge to 
ascertain sustainable drug prices.
Source: 2015 National Comprehensive Cancer Network
Figure 3.  NCCN Evidence Blocks Categories and Definitions
Source: Final Value Assessment Framework for 2017-2019. Institute for 
Clinical and Economic Review, available online at https://icer-review.org/
final-vaf-2017-2019.
Figure 4. ICER Value Framework
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Source: Final Value Assessment Framework for 2017-2019. Institute for 
Clinical and Economic Review, available online at https://icer-review.org/
final-vaf-2017-2019.
Figure 5.  ICER Potential Budget Impact Scenarios
  
TABLE 1: DEVELOPMENT OF VALUE FRAMEWORKS 
ICER NCCN ASCO
Developers ICER staff, committee of payers, 
patient organizations, physician 
organizations. Input from 
pharmaceutical industry
NCCN staff and disease 
specialists
ASCO Value in Cancer Care 
Task Force, committee of payers, 
patient organizations, physician 
organizations. Input from 
pharmaceutical industry
Open Comment? Yes No Yes 
Audience Payers Patients and Providers Patients and Providers
COMPARING VALUE FRAMEWORKS: 
DEVELOPMENT, AUDIENCE,  
AND OUTPUTS 
Each framework differs in terms of its audience, development 
process, and measures of benefit and cost. NCCN and 
ASCO are patient/provider facing, but ICER is targeted 
to payers. Methodological transparency also varies: ICER 
and ASCO have open comment periods and update their 
approaches based on stakeholder input, while NCCN has 
no formal public comment process. A comparison of the 
frameworks on multiple dimensions appears in Tables 1 and 2.
FRAMEWORKS IN THE FIELD 
Early evidence suggests that value frameworks hold promise 
in providing reliable, consistent measures of quality. A recent 
study applied the NCCN, ASCO, and ICER frameworks to 
five advanced lung cancer drugs to assess the rankings across 
frameworks and the degree to which they provide consistent 
determinations of drug quality. The frameworks ranked each of 
the drugs similarly, with stronger agreement between ASCO 
and NCCN than ICER and NCCN. Inter-rater reliability for 
each drug was highest for ASCO, and lowest for ICER.36   
However, value frameworks are far from industry standard. 
The primary users of the ICER framework have been payers, 
with the goal of informing coverage decision processes. 
Physicians have yet to adopt NCCN and ASCO in a 
systematic way. One optimistic take voiced by members 
of the Gant Consortium was that as outcomes-based risk 
sharing agreements between drug manufacturers and payers 
gain in popularity, value frameworks may establish guardrails 
for contract negotiations. 
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TABLE 2: MEASURES OF BENEFIT AND COST 
ICER NCCN ASCO
Clinical Efficacy Measures Variable, based on available data Panel assessment based on 
overall survival, progression 
free survival, or palliation of 
symptoms 
Overall survival, progression free 
survival, response rate. Bonuses for 
palliation of symptoms, tail of the 
curve survival, quality of life, and 
treatment free interval 
Safety/Toxicity Variable, based on available data 5 point scale based on 
assessment of likelihood of 
adverse event
Grade based on frequency and 
severity of toxicity 
Patient-Centered Benefits Yes, qualitative bonuses for quality 
of life improvements 
Not separately evaluated Yes, bonuses for quality of life and 
treatment-free interval
Indirect Benefits Yes, qualitative bonus for ability to 
return to work, reduced caregiver 
burden 
No No
Social Consideration Yes, qualitative bonus for reducing 
health disparities, unmet need, 
novel mechanism of action
No No
Cost Measures Cost-effectiveness analysis and 
budget impact analyses
Reported as affordability to 
patient 
Reported as drug acquisition cost 
to patient 
Outputs Value based price and value 
assessment (high/low) 
Visual representation of 1-5 
scores for efficacy, safety, quality 
of evidence, consistency of 
evidence, affordability
Quantified net health benefit score, 
drug cost to patient 
19
Opportunities for Precision Cancer
International Drug Pricing 
Americans are not alone in the struggle to define “fair prices” 
for cancer drugs. Variation in prices and spending have no 
single cause, but differing regulatory approaches to drug 
pricing can provide some lessons for policymakers in the 
United States. With no illusions about the barriers to policy 
change, the Gant Consortium looked beyond America’s 
national boundaries to learn how other nations have sought to 
balance cost, access, and innovation.  
Drug prices vary internationally. A recent study in Lancet 
of ex-factory prices (i.e., before discounts) in 16 European 
countries, Australia, and New Zealand uncovered several-
fold variation in prices of individual cancer drugs, with the 
average priced country and lowest priced country varying 
by up to 388%. Although the study could not determine the 
actual prices paid after discounts to payers were applied, it did 
suggest that prices for the same drug change across borders.37 
Another study of price variation for eight patented cancer 
drugs in seven countries found that median monthly prices 
ranged from approximately $2,500 in the UK to $8,694 in the 
United States. Put another way, patented median monthly 
drug prices were 78% of GDP per capita in the UK, but 192% 
of GDP per capita in the United States.38 
Although there are many approaches to drug regulation, 
Managed Entry Agreements (MEAs) are the most commonly 
employed abroad. These agreements between payers and 
manufacturers are among the most common regulatory levers 
used by public and private payers to balance incentivizing 
innovation with controlling price inflation, value-based pricing, 
and sustainable budgets. Although dozens of countries use 
such agreements, the Gant Consortium focused on three 
countries that differ in the structure and implementation of 
MEAs—the UK, Canada, and Germany. 
A TAXONOMY OF MANAGED ENTRY 
AGREEMENTS 
A study of MEAs in 12 OECD countries provides a useful 
typology of these agreements. Broadly speaking, MEAs are 
legal risk sharing arrangements between a drug or device 
manufacturer and a funding authority to enable faster access 
(i.e., reimbursement) to new drugs and technologies. They 
are typically used when the clinical value of a treatment is 
uncertain. MEAs tend to focus on either budget impact or 
health outcomes, although some combine the two.39  
MEAs that focus on budget impact typically use specific 
levers to control cost. These levers include initial price 
discounts for new patients, price-volume agreements that 
apply discounts after a certain spending or volume threshold 
is reached, and per-patient price caps that limit the total 
cost per patient—after which the manufacturer assumes the 
cost of the drug. MEAs that focus on health outcomes also 
use financial risk sharing, but the financial downsides for 
manufacturers are triggered by pre-set clinical performance 
indicators. These schemes include conditional coverage, in 
which payers cover a drug during a trial period as further 
clinical efficacy data are gathered for a reassessment—which 
may lead to a further price change. Other performance-linked 
agreements use outcome guarantees to make manufacturers 
financially liable for drugs that fail to perform as expected. 
Finally, conditional treatment mechanisms focus on cost-
effectiveness, in which payers are only responsible for 
covering patients for whom a new drug is effective.39   
MEAs often rely on international or domestic “reference 
pricing” systems. External reference pricing directly or 
indirectly links reimbursement for a drug to the price paid for 
the same drug in another country. Reference pricing can also 
limit prices based on the cost of similar classes of drugs. On 
20
Opportunities for Precision Cancer
the one hand, benchmarking prices to low-cost countries and 
tying new drugs’ prices to existing therapies makes reference 
pricing an attractive tool for price control. On the other hand, 
international reference pricing can incentivize manufacturers 
to limit or delay the release of new treatments in low-
income countries due to secondary effects in higher income 
countries. Furthermore, reference pricing may limit the ability 
to differentiate prices.40 Because most EU member states 
engage in some form of international reference pricing, MEAs 
in one country can have international ripple effects.41
CASE STUDIES:  
UK-NICE CANCER DRUG FUND 
As discussed earlier, the original UK Cancer Drug Fund 
(CDF) folded into NICE in 2016 after it overspent its budget. 
The new CDF operates as a managed access fund. The 
process for drug coverage approval in the UK is: 
•   Initial review by NICE, which includes cost-effectiveness 
analysis with prices set by the manufacturer. NICE either 
approves, denies coverage, or recommends provisional 
approval. 
•   Under provisional approval, NICE establishes a short-
term coverage and data collection period with a 
confidential, negotiated price. 
•   After the data collection period, NICE reappraises  
the drug, which can either be approved for coverage  
or denied.
NICE recommends a new cancer drug for interim funding 
through the CDF when there is some evidence of benefit, 
but the clinical and cost-efficacy data are too uncertain for 
full approval. The CDF covers cancer drugs during the 
provisional approval period as more data are collected. 
Importantly, the managed access period utilizes both health 
outcomes based conditional coverage provisions and price-
volume agreements. To keep the fund from overspending 
its budget, the CDF uses price-volume agreements with 
manufacturers. Furthermore, to receive provisional funding 
through the CDF, manufacturers must agree to a proportional 
rebate system if the CDF overspends its budget.42 
Some members of the Gant Consortium were skeptical 
that the NICE-CDF system could be widely adopted 
in the United States. First, the MEA and drug coverage 
system relies on the ability for public payers to say “no” 
to certain drugs, and public payers have little appetite for 
denying coverage for cancer drugs, even ones with limited 
effectiveness. By statute, Medicare is required to cover any 
FDA-approved drug prescribed by a licensed physician. In the 
case of Avastin, Medicare continued to pay for its use even 
after the FDA removed the drug’s approval for use in breast 
cancer patients. In contrast, NICE has shown more willingness 
to not recommend drugs: The institution approved 37 of 47 of 
cancer drug submissions since July 2016, and recommended 5 
more to a managed entry agreement via CDF in that time.43 
CANADA: PAN-CANADIAN ONCOLOGY 
DRUG REVIEW (PCODR) 
Canadians spend more per capita on prescription drugs 
than any other OECD country except the United States.23 
Canada’s system for covering drugs is decentralized. In-
hospital drugs are covered through the universal, publically 
funded Medicare program, but outpatient and prescription 
drugs are not included in national insurance. Individual 
provinces and territories are responsible for public drug 
coverage benefits, and about two-thirds of Canadians 
have some form of private insurance for prescription drugs. 
Although final reimbursement and pricing decisions are 
decentralized, Canada does employ a centralized system that 
issues recommendations for public insurers, though the final 
review and decision is made by each individual public drug 
plan.44 
Drugs in Canada must be reviewed by the Canadian 
Agency for Drugs and Technology in Health (CADTH) 
before they can be covered by provincial and territorial 
health plans. CADTH conducts evidence reviews and cost-
effectiveness analyses of drugs, diagnostic tests, medical 
procedures and devices. Much like the National Academy 
of Medicine in the United States, CADTH provides advice 
and recommendations (i.e., best practices) for the delivery 
of health care. CADTH has two arms for assessing drugs: 
The Common Drug Review (CDR) reviews non-oncologic 
drugs, while cancer drugs fall under the purview of the pan-
Canadian Oncology Drug Review (pCODR).45 
pCODR is tasked with assessing the clinical evidence, 
cost-effectiveness, and patient perspectives to make 
recommendations to Canadian provinces about covering  
new drugs. The keystone of pCODR’s health technology 
assessment is the pCODR Expert Review Committee 
(pERC). pERC’s deliberative framework (Table 3) has 
four criteria: overall clinical benefit, alignment with patient 
values, cost-effectiveness, and feasibility of adoption into 
health systems (budget impact). pERC’s recommendations 
synthesize reports from other advisory committees, including 
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clinical guidance panels for specific diseases, provincial 
advisory groups that provide input from each province’s health 
agency, patient advocacy groups, and economic guidance 
panels.46
Despite the well-delineated process for recommending drugs 
for coverage, Canada has the second highest drug spending 
in the world. Furthermore, because coverage decisions 
are ultimately made at the provincial level and by private 
insurers, the actual negotiated prices and discounts are kept 
confidential. Coverage for cancer drugs varies by province 
and insurer, both in terms of formulary decisions and out-of-
pocket costs. 
Canada has a national stopgap to protect consumers from 
price gouging. The Patient Medicine Prices Review Board 
(PMPRB), a consumer protection agency, has the authority 
to impose sanctions and price reductions for patented 
products deemed excessively priced. However, the PMPRB 
is hobbled in its ability to keep Canada’s drug spending low. 
PMPRB allows companies to set prices for new patented 
drugs up to the highest amount paid for other medicines 
in the same therapeutic class (an internal reference price), 
which incentivizes manufacturers to avoid lowering prices for 
older patented drugs. Furthermore, the countries the PMPRB 
uses to compare drug prices are some of the highest-priced 
countries in the world, which raises the ceiling for Canadian 
prices.47 
CASE STUDIES: GERMANY (AMNOG) 
In 2010 the German government passed the Pharmaceutical 
Market Restructuring Act, or Arzneimittelmarkt-
Neuordnungsgesetz (AMNOG), to regulate drug prices. 
AMNOG went into effect in 2011, and the legal process 
attempts to balance paying for innovative drug development 
with making decisions based on clinical efficacy. Germany’s 
compulsory health insurance system is publicly financed from 
wage taxes. Tightly regulated, independent, competing, non-
  
TABLE 3: DELIBERATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR PAN-CANADIAN ONCOLOGY DRUG REVIEW
Criteria Measures Sources
Overall clinical benefit Efficacy – health impact based on mortality, 
morbidity, and quality of life. Assessment of 
direction of effect, magnitude, and level of 
uncertainty
Safety – frequency and severity of adverse 
events
Burden of Illness – incidence of disease in 
population
Need – current availability of effective 
alternatives
Clinical Guidance Report from relevant Clinical 
Guidance Panel.
Systemic literature reviews and registered  
clinician input.
Alignment with patient values Measures of social value (e.g., social desire for 
cures for cancer)
Patient group input
Cost-effectiveness Net efficacy compared to other drugs — 
costs, cost per QALY or event avoided, 
uncertainty about net health benefits
Economic Guidance Report from Economic 
Guidance Panel, review of pharmacoeconomic 
models
Feasibility of adoption Overall assessment of budget impact Provincial advisory group input and economic 
guidance reports
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profit, non-governmental insurance funds (known as sickness 
funds), pay for the majority of health care services. Similarly, 
AMNOG relies on non-governmental bodies to conduct 
clinical efficacy reviews and allows drug makers to set their 
own prices for specified review periods, but it avoids paying 
on a cost per QALY basis.48 
The AMNOG process takes approximately 15 months. Once 
a new drug is approved (i.e., deemed safe and effective) by 
the European Medicines Agency, drug makers may set any 
price—and German health plans will fully reimburse the cost 
of the drug. Manufacturers must submit a benefits dossier 
within 3 months to the Federal Joint Commission (G-BA), 
a non-governmental body of payers, providers, and patient 
representatives. G-BA is ultimately responsible for assessing 
the clinical benefit of new treatments, but the organization 
typically commissions a clinical comparative effectiveness 
review by another non-profit organization, the Institute of 
Quality and Efficiency in Healthcare (IQWiG). Within six 
months, IQWiG returns its assessment to the G-BA based on 
a 1 through 6 scale.  
1.   Major added benefit – sustained and great improvement, 
cures or major increase in survival time/avoidance of 
serious side effects
2.   Considerable added benefit – marked improvement, 
alleviation of disease, moderate increase in survival time, 
relevant avoidance of adverse events 
3.   Minor added benefit – moderate improvement or 
reduction in non-serious symptoms 
4.   Added benefit, but not quantifiable
5.   No added benefit proven 
6.   Lower benefit than current therapies 
Benefit ratings take into account survival time, symptom 
palliation and adverse events, and improvements in quality of 
life. IQWiG may give differential rankings for distinct patient 
subpopulations and grade the quality of data provided. In the 
case of orphan drugs for rare diseases, the initial approval for 
sale is assumed to be evidence of added benefit. Therefore, 
IQWiG only assesses the expected cost of coverage. G-BA 
makes the final determination, with additional input, and it has 
shown a willingness to differ from IQWiG, mainly because 
G-BA has a wider focus beyond the scientific evidence and 
may have different interpretations of efficacy measures.  
The assessment by IQWiG and G-BA prompt a reevaluation 
of the drug price. For drugs without a demonstrated benefit 
over previously available drugs (rankings 4 through 6), payers 
will only reimburse at prices currently paid for existing drugs 
for the same conditions—an internal reference price. If drug 
manufacturers do not lower the price, patients must make 
up the difference out-of-pocket. Furthermore, if the drug 
company is deemed to have charged excessive prices for a 
lower ranked drug during the conditional coverage period, the 
manufacturer must return extra revenue as a rebate.49 
Treatments with demonstrated efficacy above existing 
therapies trigger a structured negotiation between drug 
makers and insurers. Payers and manufacturers are expected 
to agree on a discounted price within six months. If parties 
cannot reach an agreement, the decision is moved to an 
arbitration panel, which decides based on international prices 
and cost-effectiveness evaluations.50 
There is insufficient evidence to fully appraise AMNOG’s 
effects on drug pricing, access, and the development of new 
treatments, but early data suggest that price cuts for drugs 
have significantly increased since the law’s passage.51 A recent 
study suggests that Germany saved at least $1 billion on new 
drugs in 2015.52 Structurally, many aspects of the AMNOG 
process may be attractive for American policymakers. First, 
the system gives manufacturers the benefit of the doubt 
to set an appropriate price in the first year a drug comes 
to market. The health benefit assessment does not rely on 
controversial cost per QALY cost-effectiveness analysis, but 
it is a step towards evidence-based pay for value schemes. 
Finally, the process is relatively open, with disagreements 
about appropriate measures of clinical efficacy and benefit 
aired in transparent forums. 
WHAT LESSONS CAN THE UNITED STATES 
DRAW FROM OTHER SYSTEMS?
Regulatory systems for drugs cannot be copied from one 
country to the next—political and economic histories are 
both path dependent and contingent, so a system of rules 
that works in one national context may have unintended 
consequences in other places. But policymakers can still 
learn from other national regulatory experiences. Table 4 
summarizes the strategies and levers used by the highlighted 
nations to implement value-based drug pricing. 
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Studies of international regulations of drug prices and the 
Gant Consortium’s own analysis of the Canadian, English, and 
German experiences suggest that there are several “necessary 
but not sufficient” components of value-based drug 
regulations. One study of MEAs argues that key components 
of successful agreements include: 
1.   Willingness to say no – either de-list, not list, or reprice 
drugs that show little clinical or cost-efficacy 
2.   Transparent and robust methodologies for assessing 
cost-efficacy and clinical effectiveness – otherwise 
payers, manufacturers, or patient advocates may view 
funding decisions as illegitimate
3.   Value assessment and coverage decisions that are 
binding, rather than arbitrary
4.   Funding recommendations that are insulated from 
politicians
5.   Legislation that allows payers to negotiate prices and 
deny coverage for low-value treatments
6.   Assessment of both cost-effectiveness and global 
budget impact
7.   Adequate funding for cost-effectiveness and clinical 
effectiveness analyses53 
Ultimately, managed entry agreements require political 
consensus and considerable practical effort. American 
payers have typically been reticent to say no to covering 
drugs, and MEAs are built on the capacity to deny coverage 
for some treatments. The technical complexity of MEAs 
present additional implementation barriers; for example, the 
administrative burdens and complexity of collecting data 
and managing agreements with different manufacturers are 
considerable. Should MEAs be adopted more widely by 
private insurers, the discounted prices are likely to remain 
confidential. Finally, MEAs do not resolve underlying 
controversies regarding appropriate comparator drugs, 
measures of clinical efficacy, or how to build in other patient 
considerations. 
  
TABLE 4: COMPARISON OF INTERNATIONAL DRUG PRICING REGULATIONS 
Lever Germany UK Canada US
Initial discount Yes Yes Yes – provincial level 340B program, VA, 
Medicaid
Price-volume 
agreements
Yes Yes No No
Conditional coverage Yes
(clinical not cost-
effectiveness)
Yes
(clinical not cost-
effectiveness)
Yes
(clinical not cost-
effectiveness)
No
(very limited)
Performance-linked Yes No No No
International reference 
pricing
Yes No Yes No
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Orphan Drugs 
INTRODUCTION 
While cancer is a common condition in aggregate, targeted 
therapies increasingly slice cancer into smaller subsets of 
diseases. These biomarker-defined subsets can be classified as 
rare diseases, affecting only a small number of patients. Thus, 
it is helpful to review the previously trodden path of policy 
problems specific to rare conditions. 
Historically, diseases that only affect a small number of 
patients have posed unique drug development and access 
challenges. Typically, small markets fail to attract many 
entrants or competition. In the case of pharmaceuticals, 
diseases that only affect a small number of people have 
limited prospects for revenue generation and attract little 
investment.54 When a drug does come to market, the lack of 
competition tends to increase the cost of treatment. The US 
has previously grappled with market failure for treating rare 
diseases with the 1983 Orphan Drugs Act (ODA), and the 
use of the law holds both promise and cautionary tales for 
targeted oncology. 
THE 1983 ORPHAN DRUGS ACT 
The passage of the Orphan Drugs Act of 1983 marked a 
concerted federal effort to increase access to therapies for 
people with rare diseases. At the time, drug companies lacked 
financial incentives to develop drugs for small populations. 
But the general public had an interest in incentivizing such 
drugs—because taken together, orphan diseases affect 
millions of Americans. A 1984 amendment to the ODA 
defined an “orphan” disease as affecting less than 200,000 
persons in the US, or approximately 1 in 1,500 people. 54,55 
Researchers note that this is an arbitrary definition, as the 
notion of an orphan disease is a construct. Drug companies 
can apply for orphan designation for any drug, and the 
designation unlocks several benefits, including: 
•   Access to a pool of research grants ($15.5 million 
budgeted per fiscal year)56
•   Tax credits for clinical research costs (50% of clinical trial 
expenses until 2017, when they were lowered to 25% of 
expenses) 
•   Waiver of FDA approval fee (approximately $2 million)
•   Seven years of post-approval market exclusivity for 
approved indication (i.e., an additional 2 years)57
Furthermore, the ODA calls on the FDA to display “flexibility” 
when considering the approval of drugs. Proponents of the 
law argue that it has successfully hastened the development 
of dozens of effective treatments for rare diseases. At least 
450 orphan drugs have come to market since the law took 
effect,58 and the number of orphan drug designations has 
increased from an average of 63 per year to over 200 per 
year since 2010.57 A recent study in 1984 of drug approvals 
between 2009 and 2015 found that 84 of 229 approved drugs 
had an orphan designation.57 
Critics, on the other hand, argue the law is being abused. 
Despite an explosion in orphan designations, 95% of 
rare diseases still have no therapy, and multiple orphan 
designations for individual drugs may be inflating the data. 
Some observers attribute the apparent discrepancy to the 
“salami slicing” of common diseases into subsets of rare 
disease based on genetic biomarkers. Gleevec, for example, 
has nine orphan designations, and recent studies suggest 
that orphan drug approvals cluster around a small set of 
conditions, including cancer.  Furthermore, critics contend that 
the approval process for orphan drugs is less rigorous. One 
2011 study of drugs approved to treat cancer between 2004 
and 2010 found that trials used to approve orphan drugs were 
less likely to use blinding and double-blinding, had smaller 
participant numbers, and tended to use surrogate outcomes 
(such as disease response) rather than overall survival.57 
Worldwide sales of orphan drugs have grown at double the 
rate of the overall drug sales growth, becoming increasingly 
dominant in the pharmaceutical industry. In 2000, orphan 
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drugs accounted for 6% of all prescription sales. By 2015 
they were 16.4% of prescription sales.59 Supporters of the law 
cite the growth in orphan drug sales as evidence of the law’s 
success. Critics argue that because of the lax designation 
rules and the easier approval process, US taxpayers may be 
subsidizing research into an already lucrative market.
Targeted cancer therapies bring these debates into sharp 
focus.  They hold out the possibility that many common 
cancers (such as breast, prostate, and colon cancer) will 
turn into amalgams of “rare” biomarker-defined diseases, 
each qualifying for orphan status and commanding a price 
premium. The budget-busting potential of this process is 
concerning. A recent article lays out the economic factors that 
exert upward pressure on drug prices in precision medicine: 
Limited competition in small markets, followed by delayed 
generic competition when market exclusivity is extended 
beyond the patent expiration, can cause unsustainable 
pricing.53 Furthermore, targeted medicines are often biologics, 
which are more costly to develop and produce than traditional 
small molecule drugs and face limited competition from 
biosimilar drugs.
On the other hand, higher drug prices for targeted medicines 
may be warranted if they are more effective than treatments 
in unselected populations. The fundamental challenge 
that remains is how to make targeted cancer medicine 
economically sustainable as more of the population is treated 
with biomarker-defined therapies, each commanding a higher 
price than its non-targeted predecessor.
Source: Kesselheim AS, Treasure CL, Joffe S. (2017) Biomarker-Defined Subsets of Common Diseases: Policy and Economic Implications of Orphan Drug 
Act Coverage. PLoS Med 14(1):e1002190. doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1002190
Figure 6.  Orphan drug designations per year.
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Conclusion 
The Gant Consortium’s literature review surfaced several 
themes that are likely to persist as targeted therapies continue 
to define cancer care and research. Targeted cancer therapies 
are at the cutting edge of biomedical research, and the price 
of drugs has to be sufficient to make the risks involved in 
drug development worthwhile. For a number of reasons, the 
cost of cancer therapy is likely to continue to rise. However, 
these high prices may carry concerns over the distribution of 
benefits, as high prices may limit access to patients without 
significant disposable income. 
Furthermore, targeted therapies are likely to sharpen 
the debate over paying for the value of drugs. Although 
several stakeholders have laid the groundwork for formal 
value assessments, the methodologies and outputs remain 
different, and targeted therapies may require differential value 
propositions for each subpopulation.  While paying for value 
is likely to remain a goal for many policymakers, contentious 
debates remain on the horizon regarding how to factor in 
global payer budgets, patient preferences, and provider 
flexibility. 
Additionally, the struggle to create a sustainable targeted 
cancer paradigm is not a uniquely American experience. 
A review of managed entry agreements abroad finds 
that several countries are struggling to balance access 
and innovation, and different regulatory approaches have 
not landed on a singular solution. The complexity of the 
American health care system—with dozens of payers, drug 
manufacturers, and care providers—is likely to complicate “one 
size fits all” regulatory fixes. 
Finally, keeping the voices of patients and families well 
represented in discourse is likely to remain a challenge for 
payers, providers, and drug manufacturers. As the biological 
science of cancer care becomes more rarified and ways 
of measuring value become increasingly complex, asking 
meaningful questions and getting useful input from patients 
will likely grow more difficult.  Ultimately, the goal of targeted 
cancer should be to relieve suffering for cancer patients and 
families, and their voices should be heard at many steps of 
policy development. 
1.   Shih Y-CT, Smieliauskas F, Geynisman DM, Kelly RJ, Smith TJ. Trends in the Cost and Use of Targeted Cancer Therapies for the Privately Insured 
Nonelderly: 2001 to 2011. Journal of Clinical Oncology 2015;33:2190-6. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4477789/ 
2.   Targeted Cancer Therapies. National Institute of Health 2018. (Accessed February 22, 2018, at https://www.cancer.gov/about-cancer/treatment/types/
targeted-therapies/targeted-therapies-fact-sheet.)
3.   What is precision medicine? National Institute of Health, 2015. (Accessed February 23, 2018, at https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/primer/precisionmedicine/
definition.)
4.   Tsimberidou AM, Eggermont AM, Schilsky RL. Precision cancer medicine: the future is now, only better. American Society of Clinical Oncology 
educational book American Society of Clinical Oncology Meeting 2014:61-9. https://meetinglibrary.asco.org/record/89226/edbook
5.   Kinch MS, Haynesworth A, Kinch SL, Hoyer D. An overview of FDA-approved new molecular entities: 1827–2013. Drug Discovery Today 2014;19:1033-9. 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/24680947
6.   A Story of Discovery: Gleevec Transforms Cancer Treatment for Chronic Myelogenous Leukemia. National Institute of Health. at https://www.cancer.gov/
research/progress/discovery/gleevec.)
7.   Cameron D, Piccart-Gebhart MJ, Gelber RD, et al. 11 years’ follow-up of trastuzumab after adjuvant chemotherapy in HER2-positive early breast cancer: 
final analysis of the HERceptin Adjuvant (HERA) trial. Lancet (London, England) 2017;389:1195-205. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/28215665
8.   Schwaederle M, Zhao M, Lee JJ, et al. Association of Biomarker-Based Treatment Strategies With Response Rates and Progression-Free Survival in 
Refractory Malignant Neoplasms: A Meta-analysis. JAMA Oncol 2016;2:1452-9.  https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/27273579
9.   Tannock IF, Hickman JA. Limits to Personalized Cancer Medicine. N Engl J Med 2016;375:1289-94. https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/
NEJMsb1607705
10.   Novel Drug Approvals for 2016. 2017. (Accessed February 23, 2018, at https://www.fda.gov/drugs/developmentapprovalprocess/druginnovation/
ucm483775.htm.)
11.   The health condition that concerns Americans most. 2016. at https://www.cnn.com/2016/09/13/health/cancer-mayo-survey-most-important-health-
challenge/index.html.)
12.   Report: Cancer will be No. 1 killer in U.S. CNN, 2014. at https://www.cnn.com/2014/03/11/health/cancer-care-asco-report/index.html.)
13.   The top 10 leading causes of death in the United States. 2017. at https://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/282929.php.)
14.   Cancer Statistics. National Cancer Institute. at https://www.cancer.gov/about-cancer/understanding/statistics.)
15.   Ganz PA, Barry JM, Burke W, et al. National Institutes of Health State-of-the-Science Conference: Role of Active Surveillance in the Management of 
Men With Localized Prostate Cancer. Ann Intern Med 2012;146:591-595. http://annals.org/aim/fullarticle/1103897 
16.   Moses H, 3rd, Matheson DH, Cairns-Smith S, George BP, Palisch C, Dorsey ER. The anatomy of medical research: US and international comparisons. 
JAMA 2015;313:174-89. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/25585329
17.   Lloyd I. Pharma R&D Annual Review 2017: Informa UK; 2017. https://pharmaintelligence.informa.com/resources/product-content/pharma-r-and-d-
annual-review-2017
18.   Carter AJ, Nguyen CN. A comparison of cancer burden and research spending reveals discrepancies in the distribution of research funding. BMC Public 
Health 2012;12:526. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/22800364
19.   Bae YHJ, Mullins CD. Do value thresholds for oncology drugs differ from nononcology drugs? Journal of Managed Care Pharmacy 2014;20:1086-92. 
https://www.jmcp.org/doi/10.18553/jmcp.2014.20.11.1086
20.   Howard DH, Bach PB, Berndt ER, Conti RM. Pricing in the Market for Anticancer Drugs. J Econ Perspect 2015;29:139-62.  https://www.aeaweb.org/
articles?id=10.1257/jep.29.1.139
21.   Chamberlain C, Collin SM, Stephens P, Donovan J, Bahl A, Hollingworth W. Does the cancer drugs fund lead to faster uptake of cost-effective drugs? A 
time-trend analysis comparing England and Wales. Br J Cancer 2014;111:1693-702. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4453744/
27
Opportunities for Precision Cancer
References
22.   Aggarwal A, Fojo T, Chamberlain C, Davis C, Sullivan R. Do patient access schemes for high-cost cancer drugs deliver value to society?-lessons from 
the NHS Cancer Drugs Fund. Ann Oncol 2017;28:1738-50. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/28453615
23.   Kesselheim AS, Avorn J, Sarpatwari A. The High Cost of Prescription Drugs in the United States: Origins and Prospects for Reform. JAMA 
2016;316:858-71. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/27552619
24.   Observations on Trends in Prescription Drug Spending: US Department of Health and Human Services; 2016. https://aspe.hhs.gov/pdf-report/
observations-trends-prescription-drug-spending
25.   Bianca DiJulio, Jamie Firth, Brodie M. Kaiser Health Tracking Poll: August 2015: Kaiser Family Foundation 2015. https://www.kff.org/health-costs/poll-
finding/kaiser-health-tracking-poll-august-2015/
26.   Doshi JA, Li P, Huo H, Pettit AR, Armstrong KA. Association of Patient Out-of-Pocket Costs With Prescription Abandonment and Delay in Fills of 
Novel Oral Anticancer Agents. J Clin Oncol 2018;36:476-82. http://ascopubs.org/doi/abs/10.1200/JCO.2017.74.5091
27.   Mailankody S, Prasad V. Five Years of Cancer Drug Approvals: Innovation, Efficacy, and Costs. JAMA Oncol 2015;1:539-40. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.
gov/pubmed/26181265
28.   Dusetzina SB. Drug Pricing Trends for Orally Administered Anticancer Medications Reimbursed by Commercial Health Plans, 2000-2014. JAMA 
Oncol 2016;2:960-1. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/27123993
29.   Medicare Beneficiaries’ High Out-of-Pocket Costs: Cost Burdens by Income and Health Status: Commonwealth Fund. https://www.commonwealthfund.
org/publications/issue-briefs/2017/may/medicare-beneficiaries-high-out-pocket-costs-cost-burdens-income 
30.   Bennette CS, Richards C, Sullivan SD, Ramsey SD. Steady Increase In Prices For Oral Anticancer Drugs After Market Launch Suggests A Lack Of 
Competitive Pressure. Health Aff (Millwood) 2016;35:805-12. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/27140986
31.   Prasad V, Mailankody S. Research and Development Spending to Bring a Single Cancer Drug to Market and Revenues After Approval. JAMA Intern 
Med 2017;177:1569-75. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/28892524
32.   Schnipper LE, Davidson NE, Wollins DS, et al. Updating the American Society of Clinical Oncology Value Framework: Revisions and Reflections in 
Response to Comments Received. J Clin Oncol 2016;34:2925-34. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/27247218
33.   NCCN Clinical Practice Guidelines in Oncology (NCCN Guidelines®) with NCCN Evidence Blocks™. National Comprehensive Cancer Network. at 
https://www.nccn.org/evidenceblocks/.)
34.   Overview of the ICER value assessment framework and update for 2017-2019: Institute for Clinical and Economic Review 2017. https://icer-review.org/
wp-content/uploads/2018/03/ICER-value-assessment-framework-update-FINAL-062217.pdf 
35.   Foote J, Secord AA, Liang M, Cohn DE, Jewell E, Havrilesky LJ. ASCO Value Framework Highlights the Relative Value of Treatment Options in 
Ovarian Cancer. J Oncol Pract 2017;13:e1030-e9. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/29016225
36.   Bentley TGK, Cohen JT, Elkin EB, et al. Validity and Reliability of Value Assessment Frameworks for New Cancer Drugs. Value Health 2017;20:200-5. 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/28237195 
37.   Vogler S, Vitry A, Babar ZU. Cancer drugs in 16 European countries, Australia, and New Zealand: a cross-country price comparison study. Lancet Oncol 
2016;17:39-47. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26670089
38.   Goldstein DA, Clark J, Tu Y, et al. A global comparison of the cost of patented cancer drugs in relation to global differences in wealth. Oncotarget 
2017;8:71548-55. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5641070/
39.   Alessandra Ferrario, Kanavos P. Managed entry agreements for pharmaceuticals: the European experience. Brussels, Belgium: EMiNet; 2013. http://
eprints.lse.ac.uk/50513/
40.   Persson U, Jönsson B. The End of the International Reference Pricing System? Applied Health Economics and Health Policy 2016;14:1-8. https://www.
ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26112982
41.   Ruggeri K, Nolte E. Pharmaceutical Pricing: The Use of External Reference Pricing. Rand health quarterly 2013;3:6. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
pubmed/28083293
42.   NHS England Cancer Drugs Fund Team. Appraisal and Funding of Cancer Drugs from July 2016 (including the new Cancer Drugs Fund): NHS 
England; 2016. https://www.england.nhs.uk/publication/cdf-sop-16/
43.   Dillon A, Landells LJ. Nice, the nhs, and cancer drugs. JAMA 2018. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/29387883
44.   Valérie Paris, Belloni A. COUNTRY PROFILE: CANADA: OECD; 2014. https://www.oecd.org/canada/Value-in-Pharmaceutical-Pricing-Canada.pdf
45.   About CADTH. Canadian Agency for Drugs and Technologies in Health. at https://cadth.ca/about-cadth.)
28
Opportunities for Precision Cancer
46.   pCODR Expert Review Committee Deliberative Framework: pan-Canadian Oncology Drug Review; 2016. https://www.cadth.ca/sites/default/files/
pcodr/The%20pCODR%20Expert%20Review%20Committee%20%28pERC%29/pcodr_perc_deliberative_frame.pdf
47.   Pharmaceutical prices in the 21st century. New York, NY: Springer Berlin Heidelberg; 2015.
48.   AMNOG since 2011. at https://www.iqwig.de/en/about-us/10-years-of-iqwig/amnog-since-2011.6333.html.)
49.   AMNOG revisited. McKinsey & Company, 2015. at https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/pharmaceuticals-and-medical-products/our-insights/amnog-
revisited.)
50.   Gerber-Grote A. Early Benefit Assessment and Health Economic Evaluation: Experiences and Challenges under the New Law since Jan 1st, 2011: 
ISPOR Berlin; 2012. https://www.ispor.org/congresses/Berlin1112/presentations/IP4_Gerber.pdf
51.   When do price changes occur for branded pharmaceuticals in the top 5 EU markets? IHS Markit, 2015. at https://ihsmarkit.com/research-analysis/when-
do-price-changes-occur-for-branded-pharmaceuticals-in-the-top-5-eu-markets.html.)
52.   Lauterbach K, McDonough J, Seeley E. Germany’s model for drug price regulation could work in the US. Health Affairs Blog 2016. https://www.
healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20161229.058150/full/ 
53.   Goldstein DA, Sarfaty M. Cancer Drug Pricing and Reimbursement: Lessons for the United States From Around the World. Oncologist 2016;21:907-9. 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4978557/
54.   Stern AD, Alexander BM, Chandra A. How economics can shape precision medicines. Science 2017;355:1131. http://science.sciencemag.org/
content/355/6330/1131 
55.   Herder M. What Is the Purpose of the Orphan Drug Act? PLOS Medicine 2017;14:e1002191. http://journals.plos.org/plosmedicine/article?id=10.1371/
journal.pmed.1002191
56.   FAQ Concerning the Orphan Products Clinical Trials Grants Program. US Food and Drug Administration, 2017. at https://www.fda.gov/ForIndustry/
DevelopingProductsforRareDiseasesConditions/WhomtoContactaboutOrphanProductDevelopment/ucm224956.htm.)
57.   Kesselheim AS, Treasure CL, Joffe S. Biomarker-Defined Subsets of Common Diseases: Policy and Economic Implications of Orphan Drug Act 
Coverage. PLOS Medicine 2017;14:e1002190. http://journals.plos.org/plosmedicine/article?id=10.1371/journal.pmed.1002190
58.   Drugs For Rare Diseases Have Become Uncommonly Rich Monopolies. NPR/Kaiser Health News, 2017. at https://www.npr.org/sections/health-
shots/2017/01/17/509506836/drugs-for-rare-diseases-have-become-uncommonly-rich-monopolies.)
59.   Hadjivasiliou A. Orphan Drug Report 2017: Evaluate Pharma; 2017. http://info.evaluategroup.com/rs/607-YGS-364/images/EPOD17.pdf
29
Opportunities for Precision Cancer
COLONIAL PENN CENTER
3641 LOCUST WALK
PHILADELPHIA, PA 19104
LDI.UPENN.EDU
 @PENNLDI
